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Abstract. High-security processes have to load confidential information into
shared resources as part of their operation. This confidential information may be
leaked (directly or indirectly) to low-security processes via the shared resource.
This paper considers leakage from high-security to low-security processes from
the perspective of scheduling. The workflow model is here extended to support
preemption, security levels, and leakage. Formalization of leakage properties is
then built upon this extended model, allowing formal reasoning about the secu-
rity of schedulers. Several heuristics are presented in the form of compositional
preprocessors and postprocessors as part of a more general scheduling approach.
The effectiveness of such heuristics are evaluated experimentally, showing them
to achieve significantly better schedulability than the state of the art. Modeling of
leakage from cache attacks is presented as a case study.
1 Introduction
This paper considers a shared resource system where processes are classified as either
high-security or low-security. High-security processes work with confidential informa-
tion that should not be leaked to low-security processes. Typically, this includes loading
confidential information into memory for use within high-security processes. Examples
of such confidential information include encryption keys, medical data, and bank de-
tails. This confidential information may be vital to the operation of the high-security
processes, but must also be tightly controlled and not be leaked to low-security pro-
cesses. For instance, in an embedded sensor, high-security encryption processes handle
encryption keys that must not be leaked to low-security data compression processes.
However, high-security processes may not properly flush confidential information
from the shared resource, or context switching may interrupt their execution before such
flushing can be applied. Consequently, confidential information remaining in the shared
resource becomes (directly or indirectly) available to low-security processes.
Consider the small example in Fig. 1, written in Intel x86-64 assembly code
for Linux compiled to ELF format3. There are two processes: Process 1 doing
some (trivial) encryption operations, and Process 2 attempting to access the en-
cryption key. Process 1 takes a key $KEY and a message $MSG then encrypts the
message with the key using an exclusive or XOR operation. The result is then output
to the disk (represented by $DISK1). Process 2 writes to a different disk location
(represented by $DISK2) the content of register r13. It is clear that if Process 2
is executed after the first operation and before the fourth operation of Process 1,
then the value of the key is directly leaked.
; Process 1:
mov r13,$KEY ; load key to register r13
mov r14,$MSG ; load message to register r14
xor r14,r13 ; encrypt message with key
; using XOR, store result in r14
xor r13,r13 ; wipe value of key
out $DISK1,r14 ; output the ciphertext (r14)
; Process 2:
out $DISK2,r13 ; output r13 (may store the key)
Fig. 1: Example Processes with schedule-dependent confidential information leakage.
If a scheduler is aware of a process’ access level, then the scheduler can take action
to prevent confidential information being leaked to low-security processes. Recent work
[15, 17] has explored these kinds of problems in a real-time setting by scheduling a
complete resource (memory) flush after any high-security process that is followed by
a low-security process. However, this provides only limited options to the scheduler
since such a complete resource flush is expensive and may prevent real-time tasks from
meeting their deadlines. Further, when flushing is not possible, current approaches do
not quantify the information leakage, simply considering any leakage unacceptable.
This paper proposes treating confidentiality, measured by the resulting leakage of
secure information, as a quantitative resource that the scheduler can exploit. This allows
for better quantification of the resulting leakage in different scenarios, as well as having
a clear measure of the cost of different scheduling choices. Further, this allows for
the creation of schedulers that can make better scheduling choices and also respect
confidential information leakage constraints.
The paper builds upon the workflow model commonly used to represent real-time
systems [3, 9, 26]. In the workflow model a set of tasks periodically produce jobs that
have to be scheduled to complete before deadlines.
The workflow model is here extended by considering tasks to be composed of steps,
each of which has an execution time, leakage value, and security level. Each one of these
steps is implicitly an atomic sequence of actions that can be taken within a task without
preemption by the scheduler. Thus a task consists of an ordered sequence of steps to be
performed, that yields the total behavior of the task.
Using this extended workflow model, schedulers can operate upon steps rather than
jobs, and so implement preemption while also being able to reason about leakage in a
fine-grained manner. This supports offline schedulers in periodic systems that can plan
an optimal strategy, as well as online schedulers that optimize using the knowledge
available. (The focus in this paper is on the former.) Further, schedulers can be consid-
ered that operate over leakage thresholds or within quantified security constraints.
The approach in this paper easily captures prior work [15, 17] by inserting a flush
task that has a known runtime cost and ensures a complete resource (memory) wipe
3 Technical details for X86-64 (https://software.intel.com/sites/default/files/article/402129/mpx-
linux64-abi.pdf) and ELF initialization (http://lxr.linux.no/linux+v3.2.4/arch/ia64/include/asm/elf.h).
(and thus zero resulting leakage). When a high-security job would be followed by a low-
security job, a flush is inserted between them. This enforces zero resulting leakage, but
often results in poor schedulability due to the high cost of frequently flushing resources.
By considering the flush task to be always available (rather than at prescribed times),
schedulers can add flushes when this reduces resulting leakage and still achieve schedu-
lability. Indeed, it is often possible to achieve zero resulting leakage even when flushing
after every high-security job is not possible. Thus, solutions can be found here that
achieve zero leakage that could not be scheduled by the prior state-of-the-art.
More generally, this paper proposes heuristic algorithms to achieve efficient schedul-
ing while reducing resulting leakage, i.e. the amount of confidential information that can
be leaked to low-security jobs. Thus allowing for more flexibility in choices; a schedul-
ing approach may allow a limited amount of leakage to achieve schedulability. The
scheduling algorithms presented here produce a schedule for a set of tasks. Standard
scheduling algorithms are extended with a preprocessing and a postprocessing phase.
Preprocessing modifies the set of tasks to be scheduled, while postprocessing modifies
the schedule produced by a scheduling algorithm to yield another schedule. Several pre-
and postprocessors designed to reduce leakage are introduced in this paper.
Experimental results are presented that demonstrate the trade-off between leakage
and schedulability. These show that this approach schedules, with good (or zero) result-
ing leakage, sets of tasks that are not schedulable by the state-of-the-art. Different pre-
and postprocessors and their impact on the resulting leakage are evaluated. This clearly
illustrates that there is a trade-off to be made between leakage and schedulability. Ac-
cepting some leakage can allow for schedulability when requiring zero leakage would
fail to be schedulable. Further, experimental results here show that zero leakage can still
be achieved in cases where the current state-of-the-art fails schedulability.
A case study demonstrates the flexibility of the model, by detailing how to represent
cache attacks and their leakage using the extended workflow model. This demonstrates
a different leakage model and alternative ways to exploit the model.
Key Contributions. The key contributions of this paper are as follows.
– A model to reason quantitatively on the amount of information leaked by schedul-
ing tasks with different security levels on a shared resource system.
– A scheduling approach with compositional and specialized pre- and postprocessors
that schedule tasks while reducing the amount of confidential information leaked.
– Several heuristic pre- and postprocessing algorithms that can reduce leakage.
– Experimental evaluation of the combinations of the pre- and postprocessors, show-
ing that the approach provides significantly better schedulability and lower infor-
mation leakage than the state of the art.
– A case study showing how to adapt the model to other scenarios and kinds of leak-
age, demonstrated with cache attacks.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 recalls background information.
Section 3 extends the workflow model. Section 4 presents our approach to schedul-
ing used here, with algorithms for pre- and postprocessing. Section 5 highlights and
discusses the experimental results. Section 6 presents a case study on adapting leak-
age for cache attacks. Section 7 discusses variations and extensions to the model and
algorithms. Section 8 concludes and considers future work.
2 Background
Workflow Model. This section recalls the workflow model, a standard model for the
scheduling of periodic tasks [3, 9, 26]. Section 3 extends the workflow model to account
for the possible leakage of confidential information. Assume an infinite time divided
into discrete time units indexed by natural numbers. Let Γ be a set of independent
periodic tasks {Tα,Tβ, . . . } with each task Tx ∈ Γ having a period Px, an execution
time Ex, and a relative deadline Dx. A job τx,k is produced by the activation of a task
Tx ∈ Γ at release time Rx,k = (k − 1)Px, ∀k ∈ N0. Each job τx,k must be completed
before its absolute deadline Ax,k = Rx,k + Dx. The hyperperiod HΓ of a set of tasks
Γ corresponds to the least common multiplier of the period Px of each task Tx ∈ Γ:
HΓ = lcm{Px | Tx ∈ Γ}.
Scheduling Algorithms. This paper uses two standard scheduling algorithms to sched-
ule the jobs produced by sets of tasks: Earliest Deadline First (EDF) and Least Slack
First (LSF). Both are simple and widely used offline scheduling algorithms based on
dynamic priority of the jobs being scheduled. EDF determines the priority of jobs ac-
cording to their absolute deadline. At any given point in time, out of the currently avail-
able jobs, the job with the earliest absolute deadline is scheduled first. LSF determines
the priority of jobs according to their amount of slack. This slack is calculated for a job
τx,k according to the formula Ax,k − t−Ex where t is the current time. At any given point
in time, out of the currently available jobs, the job with the least slack is scheduled first.
Information Leakage. Information leakage quantifies the amount of confidential in-
formation leaked by a system, and is widely used to measure of the (in)security of the
system [1, 2, 4, 12]. In this paper, leakage is used to measure the amount of confidential
information that a high-level job leaves in the shared resource at different moments of
its execution. The unit of measure of leakage is not relevant since it depends on the
specific application. For instance, if the confidential information is a private key, leak-
age could measure the number of bits of the key that are leaked. Alternatively, leakage
could measure the number of confidential packets leaked from a secure transmission.
Therefore, the same leakage model can be used with different leakage measures, where
zero leakage represents no loss of confidential information.
Related Work. Real-time systems need to communicate with the outside world, such
as receiving data from sensors or communicating with other systems, sometimes over
unsecured networks. This communication has allowed attacks against even air-gapped
industrial control systems [8].
The real-time scheduling requirement itself can be exploited to generate additional
vulnerabilities. For instance, a process can modulate its use of a resource to affect the
scheduling of another process, and use this to covertly transmit information [20, 21].
Further vulnerabilities can occur in any system with shared resources. When pro-
cesses with different security levels share the same memory resources, it is possible
for low-security processes to monitor the access to confidential information by high-
security processes, causing information leakage [15]. Using separated memory for pro-
cesses with different security levels is expensive, particularly if the system has more
than two security levels. Mohan et al. [15] consider a shared memory scenario where
low-security processes executing after high-security processes could access the high-
security processes’ memory space resulting in information leakage. To prevent this,
they propose completely flushing the shared resource (memory) after the execution of
high-security processes when followed by a low-security process. In [17], Pellizzoni
et al. generalize this work by introducing a binary relation no-leak on tasks, where
no-leak(Tx,Ty) holds if no leakage can occur from Tx to Ty. The authors also deter-
mine the number of resource (memory) flushes needed to enforce the no-leak relation,
and consequently construct a preemptivity-assignment scheduling algorithm. This work
proposes a more fine-grained approach to confidentiality in similar scenarios.
Another less formal approach is that used in [24] where they limit the time between
preemptions between virtual machines in an online scheduling scenario to prevent cache
attacks. This can be represented using the approach here as a case study.
Intel propose the Software Guard Extension (SGX) architecture to prevent leakage
through shared memory [7]. SGX aims to keep each process in a separate enclave,
and keep these enclaves isolated from other processes (and flushing them upon exit).
However, Schwarz et al. [19] demonstrate that SGX is not safe using cache attacks.
Formal analysis of scheduling system under resource constraints has been per-
formed by Kim et al. [13, 14]. The proposed approach can be extended to confidentiality
as a resource using the model proposed in this paper.
3 Model
This section introduces the key concepts and model of the system being scheduled,
and is based upon the workflow model recalled in Section 2. The extension here is to
represent precise information about the internal operations and preemptivity of tasks by
dividing them into steps. Steps include their own execution time (like a task or job), and
are extended to include leakage value and security level. Special tasks are also added
to model other operations of the system. The rest of this section details this extended
model and presents illustrative examples that motivate the choices in this paper.
3.1 Concept
This section considers concepts and motivations for the model presented here; the divi-
sion of tasks into steps, accounting for leakage, and justification for special tasks.
Steps. This model considers the possibility to divide tasks into fine-grained steps. A
step represents an atomic sequence of operations that cannot be interrupted by preemp-
tion. The practical implementation of steps depends on the architecture and granularity
of the scheduling system. The model is agnostic to step implementation details as long
as an execution time, leakage value, and security level can be defined for each step. The
most fine-grained approach would be to consider each CPU operation as a step. For in-
stance, Process 1 in Fig. 1 would be represented as a task divided into five steps. Thus,
a task could be preempted after each CPU operation. Although very simple, in practice
this approach is too fine-grained. In lightweight and embedded systems it is common
to delegate part of the handling of preemption and atomicity to the programmer, so it is
reasonable to consider that the programmer themself could define the steps.
Special Tasks. This paper considers two special tasks representing special system op-
erations: flush and wait. The flush task flushes all confidential information from the
shared resource, for instance by overwriting all shared memory with zeroes. This pre-
serves compatibility with the state of the art [15, 17] where flushing is used as the main
tool to preserve confidentiality. The wait task represents idle processor time. Apart from
the obvious use, scheduling of idle time can impact confidentiality of the system.
Leakage Values. The leakage value of a step represents the amount of confidential
information that would be leaked to an attacker able to read the shared resource just
after the steps’ execution. The model does not constrain the way the leakage value is
obtained: leakage can be added by the programmer as an annotation, computed by an
automatic tool [5, 6, 23], or possibly both. For instance, the programmer could spec-
ify critical zones in which the program must not be interrupted, and the leakage values
would be computed automatically by a tool (for both critical and non-critical zones). An
alternative, variable-based approach would be to have the programmer annotate some
variables as containing confidential information at a certain point (and as cleared of
confidential information at a later point). Taint analysis can be used to identify which
variables are tainted at each point. Information leakage quantification can be used to
quantify leakage from the tainted variables.
3.2 Formal Model
Steps, Tasks and Jobs.
Definition 1 (Step). Formally, each step is a tuple S(E, L, X) where E denotes the
(worst case) execution time that the step takes to be completed, L denotes its (potential)
leakage value, and X denotes its security level (either high > or low ⊥).
The (potential) leakage value L of a step S is a measure of the amount of confiden-
tial information left in a shared resource at the completion of S. Here > indicates that
the step contains confidential information and therefore is high-security. Similarly, ⊥
indicates that the step should not have access to confidential information and therefore
is low-security. Since > and ⊥ are used to indicate whether the step has access to confi-
dential information,⊥ steps typically have leakage zero. This is not a strict requirement,
see Section 6. The choice of having two security levels here is to clearly illustrate the
model, however the extension to any number of security levels is straightforward.
For instance, consider Process 1 in Fig. 1. Each assembly instruction can be
represented by a single step with an execution time of one time unit and a security
level of >. The first three instructions have a leakage value of one, representing the
fact that one word of confidential information (the key) is in the shared resource
(in register r13). However, the remaining instructions have a leakage value of zero
since the fourth instruction wipes r13.
The system operates with a set of tasks Γ = {Tα,Tβ, . . .}.
Definition 2 (Task). Each task Tx ∈ Γ is a tuple Tx(Px,Dx, Ŝx) where Px is the period
of the task, Dx is its relative deadline, and Ŝx is a sequence of steps Sxa,Sxb, . . .making
up the ordered actions of the task.
Tasks are named with Greek letters, e.g.Tβ. Steps are named with the corresponding
task’s Greek letter and a Latin letter in alphabetical order, e.g. step Sβc represents the
third step of task Tβ.
Observe that Process 1 in Fig. 1 can be modeled by the following task:
Tα = T (Pα,Dα, (Sαa(1, 1,>),Sαb(1, 1,>),Sαc(1, 1,>),Sαd(1, 0,>),Sαe(1, 0,>)) ).
Similarly, Process 2 in Fig. 1 can be modeled by the following task:
Tβ = T (Pβ,Dβ,Sβa(1, 0,⊥)) .
Definition 3 (Job). Each job τx,k is created by the activation of the task Tx at release
time Rx,k = (k−1)Px for k ∈ N0, and is a tuple τx,k(Rx,k, Ax,k, Ŝx,k) where Ax,k = Rx,k +Dx
is the job’s absolute deadline, and Ŝx,k is the sequence of steps inherited from task Tx.
Jobs are named with the corresponding task’s Greek letter and the number k, so job
τβ4 is the fourth job generated by task Tβ and step Sβ4c is the third step of job τβ4.
For simplicity, a task (resp. job) will be referred to as > or ⊥ when all steps within
that task (resp. job) are either > or ⊥, respectively.
Flush and Wait. The model uses a task to represent complete flushing of the shared
resource. The flush task is defined by TF (−,−,SF (EF , 0,>)) where EF is the execution
time to completely flush the shared resource. Observe that after flushing the shared
resource the leakage is reduced to zero. This is achieved by the single step SF (EF , 0,>)
that takes all the execution time of the flush task and has a zero leakage value. Since
the flush task is always available to be scheduled, it has no defined period or deadline
(denoted here as -), being able to scheduled (or not) at whim. The security level of
flush is > since it is acceptable for flush to have access to confidential information, and
for use in calculating the resulting leakage (see below). For simplicity and when no
ambiguity may occur, F is used for the flush task or step.
To represent idle processor time, define the wait task as TW(−,−,SW(1, ∗, ∗)) .
Similar to flush, wait is always available to be scheduled and has no period or deadline
(again denoted as -). Wait also has a single step that has the minimal runtime of one
time unit. However, the leakage value of wait is here denoted by ∗ since waiting does
not change the shared resource, instead the ∗ denotes that the leakage value of a wait
step is the same as the previous step. Similarly, the security level is also represented by
∗ because it is the same as the previous step. Again for simplicity and where no ambi-
guity may occur,W may be used in place of the wait task or step.
Traces, Solutions, and Resulting Leakage.
(a) Solution leaking information. (b) Solution leaking no information.
Fig. 2: Schedulings for the processes in Fig. 1.
Definition 4 (Trace). A trace S̃ = (S1(E1, L1, X1),S2(E2, L2, X2), . . . ) is a (possibly
infinite) sequence of n ∈ N ∪ {∞} steps that may come from any number of jobs.
In a trace, Step S1 starts execution at time t1 = 0, and each step Si for i > 1 starts
execution at time ti =
∑i−1
j=1 E j and terminates execution at time ti + Ei. The notation
S̃1 ++S̃2 is used to indicate concatenation of traces S̃1 and S̃2, and S̃ \ S1 the removal
of the step S1 from the trace S̃. The focus of this paper is upon solutions.
Definition 5 (Solution). A trace S̃ is a solution S if:
1. for each job τ(R, A, Ŝ):
(a) each step in Ŝ appears in the trace S̃ in the order that it appears in Ŝ;
(b) the first step of Ŝ does not start execution before R;
(c) the last step of Ŝ does not terminate execution after A;
2. each step that is not waitW or flush F appears exactly once in the trace S̃.
Given a set of tasks Γ, a solution S is a solution for Γ, written SΓ, iff ∀Tx ∈ Γ,∀k ∈
N0 then for each job τx,k(Rx,k, Ax,k, Ŝx,k) it holds that every step in Ŝx,k is in S.
A solution S is periodic if it periodically repeats the same sequence of steps up to
job indexing. For simplicity, a periodic solution may be represented by the periodically
repeated sequence alone.
Given a trace S̃ the resulting leakage L (S̃) of trace S̃ represents the total amount
of information leaked during the execution of the jobs scheduled according to S̃.
Definition 6 (Resulting leakage). Given a trace S̃ composed of n steps with n ∈ N ∪
{∞}, the resulting leakage L (S̃) of the trace S̃ is defined inductively as follows:
– if n ≤ 1, then L (S̃) = 0;
– if n > 1 and the second step S2 of trace S̃ is >, then the resulting leakage is the
leakage of the trace without the first step S1: L (S̃) = L (S̃ \ S1) ;
– if n > 1 and the second step S2 of trace S̃ is ⊥, then the resulting leakage is the
leakage of the trace without the first step S1 = S(E1, L1, X1) plus the leakage value
L1 of the first step S1: L (S̃) = L (S̃ \ S1) + L1 .
Since every solution S is a trace S̃, a solution’s resulting leakage L (S) is defined in
the same manner.
Recall the example from Fig. 1. The solution in Fig. 2a has resulting leakage
one, since Process 2 is executed when the key is in the shared resource and so
the step Sβa is able to access the key.
However, the solution in Fig. 2b has resulting leakage is zero, since Process 2
is executed after the key has been wiped from the shared resource.
If a solution is periodic, the periodic leakage can be calculated as follows. Given
one instance of the periodically repeated sequence of steps S̃ = (S1,S2, . . . ,Si), the
periodic leakage is the resulting leakage of the sequence S̃++S1.
4 Our Approach
The overarching goal of the approach proposed in this paper is to produce a solution
with low resulting leakage for a given set of tasks. To achieve this, standard offline
scheduling algorithms are extended with a preprocessing and a postprocessing phase.
The preprocessing phase transforms a set of tasks Γ into a set of preprocessed tasks Γ′.
Then scheduling is applied to Γ′ obtaining a solution S′Γ′ for Γ′. Finally, the postpro-
cessing phase transforms the solution S′Γ′ into a postprocessed solution S′′Γ′ . Both the
pre- and postprocessing phases can affect the desired solution S′′Γ′ , here with the goal
of reducing the resulting leakage. The rest of this section presents various heuristic al-
gorithms used for the results (see Section 5). The scheduling algorithms considered are
EDF and LSF. Note that EDF and LSF do no consider the security-level or leakage of
the steps (for discussion of this see Section 7). The rest of this section focuses upon the
pre- and postprocessors. The division in phases creates a modular and compositional
approach, allowing for a better comparison of different pre- and postprocessors.
4.1 Preprocessing
Preprocessors are algorithms that take a set of tasks Γ and produce a set of tasks Γ′
to be scheduled. This paper considers preprocessors that attempt to “merge” adjacent
steps with the same security level within each task in Γ. The merged step has the sum
of the execution times of the merged steps, the leakage value of the last merged step,
and the same security level as the merged steps. For instance, the steps Sαa(1, 0,>) and
Sαb(1, 4,>) could be merged producing the step Sαa′ (2, 4,>). The rest of this section
presents three preprocessing algorithms that exploit merging.
Total Merge. The Total Merge algorithm merges all the steps in a task into a single
step.The merging is achieved by starting with a step that has execution time and leakage
value zero. The execution time for each other step in the task is then added, and the
leakage value from the last step being merged is preserved. The security level is set to
that of the last step (this is reasonable here since all steps within a task share the same
security level, for other approaches to this see Section 6). Finally, the processed task
uses this single merged step as its only step.
One-Step Merge. The One-Step Merge algorithm attempts to merge pairs of adjacent
steps. Adjacent pairs are merged iff the leakage of the former step is higher than the
latter. This is achieved by iterating through the steps Si of the task. If Li > Li+1, then the
steps Si and Si+1 are merged. Otherwise, Si is maintained unchanged. This algorithm
generates a new sequence of steps Ŝ′, that are then used in the processed task.
n-Step Merge. A straightforward extension to the One-Step Merge algorithm is to
allow merging of any number of steps. This appears in the results as n-Step Merge.
4.2 Postprocessing
Postprocessing algorithms take one solution and produce another solution. This can be
done by any possible manipulation of the steps within the original solution S′Γ to pro-
duce the new solution S′′Γ that does not break the property of being a solution for Γ.
The rest of this section presents four such postprocessors.
Add Flush. The Add Flush algorithm replaces sequences ofW with F where possible.
Add Flush operates by finding sequences of W whose length is greater than or equal
the execution time of F . If such a sequence is found, a F is added to the produced
solution instead of the initial sequence ofW with execution time equal to the F . Any
remainingW in the solution are maintained.
Swap. The Swap algorithm attempts to reduce the resulting leakage by swapping steps
within the solution.Swap works by considering each step Si. Then each possible swap
[Si ↔ S j] between the step Si and a following step S j is considered. If the trace with
this swap applied has less resulting leakage and is still a solution, then this solution
[Si ↔ S j]S is kept as the best possible solution so far. Finally, once all possible swaps
have been considered, the best swap to the solution is applied and i is incremented.
Move. The Move algorithm moves one step to a new position in the solution. Move
works in the same manner as the Swap postprocessor, except instead of swapping [Si ↔
S j]S the steps Si and S j, the move [Si −→ S j]S moves the step Si to be after S j. For
example: [S1 −→ S3]Sa,Sb,Sc = Sb,Sc,Sa where the first step Sa is moved to be
after the third step Sc. The rest of the algorithm is the same as Swap, finding the best
possible move and ensuring the trace after the move is a solution. The algorithm is
identical to the Swap algorithm substituting [Si ↔ S j]S with [Si −→ S j]S in Line 4.
1-Swap. Observe that if only swapping or moving with the following step is considered,
that is [Si ↔ Si+1] or [Si −→ Si+1], then the swap and move postprocessors coincide.
This postprocessor is denoted as 1-Swap in the results.
5 Experimental Results
This section discusses the results obtained by running experiments with the preprocess-
ing, scheduling, and postprocessing algorithms in this paper.
The experiments were conducted by using approximately 30,000 randomly gener-
ated sets of tasks4, and then testing each possible combination of one preprocessing, one
4 30,000 sets of tasks were generated, 22 were discarded as unschedulable.
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Fig. 3: Failures and leakage results for pre- and postprocessing.
scheduling, and one postprocessing algorithm. Each set of tasks consists of 2 to 6 tasks
with at least one > task and one ⊥ task, with each task having 1 to 8 steps, and each step
execution time from 1 to 5.
Preprocessor Postprocessor
Merge None Add Flush Swap Move 1-Swap
None 2 116 1919 1903 190
One-Step 1 93 1567 1489 149
n-Step 1 88 1486 1404 141
Table 1: Average execution time (in ms) for each com-
bination of pre- and postprocessor (except Total Merge)
using the EDF scheduling algorithm.
Sets of tasks with a hyper-
period over 5000 have been
discarded to reduce testing
time. The code5 to perform
the tests and implement
the preprocessing, schedul-
ing, and postprocessing is
written in Java 1.8, and all
experiments conducted on a
Linux 3.13 64-bit kernel on
an Intel Core i7-3720QM
2.60GHz CPU with 8GB of RAM. A demo6 is available that shows examples, and
allows users to conduct their own GUI-based experiments. The rest of this section dis-
cusses experimental outcomes.
The first point of interest is the schedulability of the set of tasks used in each ex-
periment. Merging task steps in a preprocessor can make a set of tasks unschedulable,
and the EDF and LSF scheduling algorithms are not equally able to find solutions. The
failure percentage for each combination of preprocessing and scheduling algorithm is
shown in Fig. 3a.
5 Available via git from: https://scm.gforge.inria.fr/anonscm/git/secleakpublic/secleakpublic.git
6 Demo available via website at: http://secleakpublic.gforge.inria.fr/
Fig. 3a clearly shows that greater merging of steps leads to more schedulability fail-
ures. In particular, indicating that Total Merge is not an effective algorithm to use in
practice despite being considered the current state of the art [15, 17]. This is a strong
motivation for the approach presented in this work to consider fine-grained prepro-
cessing and preemption of tasks. Due to its high failure rate, Total Merge will not be
considered further in this paper.
Fig. 3a also shows that, for all preprocessing algorithms, EDF performs better for
schedulability than LSF. (This is expected since EDF is guaranteed to find a solution
if the tasks are schedulable, while LSF is not.) The two scheduling algorithms produce
almost the same results for every other measure tested, so the rest of this paper shall
present only experimental results using the EDF scheduling algorithm.
Comparing the experimental results from postprocessing algorithms, the average
resulting leakages for each combination of pre- and postprocessor is shown in Fig. 3b,
while the average running times to generate a solution are shown in Table 1.
As expected, solutions without any postprocessing produce the highest resulting
leakage. The best resulting leakage is obtained by the Add Flush algorithm. (This would
correspond to the approach in [15, 17] when combined with Total Merge, however as
noted above this is often not schedulable.) Note that merging preprocessors reduce total
time, since they reduce the number of steps that the scheduler has to schedule.
1-Swap slightly reduces the resulting leakage, however Table 1 shows that it is sig-
nificantly more expensive than the scheduling operation, so 1-Swap could be applied
after Add Flush only if the cost is acceptable. Swap and Move do not reduce the re-
sulting leakage significantly more than 1-Swap and are significantly more expensive to
compute. These indicate that there is a balance to be found depending on the scenario.
Taking significant time to pre-compute an optimal scheduling strategy for a sensor or
other real-time system prior to shipping could be worth the time cost. However, for on-
line scheduling with limited (or no) ability to look ahead and consider such options, the
cost of anything more complex than Add Flush or 1-Swap may be too much.
6 Case Study: Modeling Cache Attacks
This section demonstrates how to reason about cache attacks using the model presented
in this paper, and how leakage can be used in different ways. This includes how to adapt
resulting leakage to represent leakage via cache attacks, and how to exploit the general
definition of the model to handle more complex notions of leakage.
In cache attacks, the shared resource is the cache itself. There are several approaches
to gaining information from the cache (which is in general a form of side-channel at-
tack) [10, 18, 22, 25]. One such method is for the attacker to attempt to load code that
uses the same cache lines as the program being attacked. When these load very quickly,
then this indicates that the program being attacked has already loaded particular parts
of the program, and from this the attacker can infer information about the program.
The main point in modeling cache attacks is that leakage is related to the cache
lines, and there are many such lines in the cache. Thus, the measure of leakage is which
lines of the cache are known to have been loaded by the attacker.
This can be modeled using the techniques in this paper, by exploiting the flexibility
of the leakage representation as follows:
– The leakage value L of a step is represented by a bit-vector, with 1 bit for each
cache line. Loading a cache line is represented by setting the bit in the bit-vector
that represents that line of the cache to 1.
– When calculating leakage from a trace, the leakage is calculated by taking the bit-
wise disjunction (represented as |) of the leakage bit-vectors. Observe that this au-
tomatically accounts for over-writing by newer lines.
– The leakage result from a high security step to a low security step can then be
calculated over bit-vectors, e.g. by the bit-wise conjunction operation (represented
as &). Recall that since the attacker loads cache lines to test if another process has
accessed these lines, they will appear to have loaded these lines to another step.
– The flush step F is represented by setting the leakage vector to 0000.
For example, assume four cache lines, then leakage would be represented by
bit-vectors of length four. A step that loads into the first cache line would have the
leakage bit-vector 1000, and the step that loads into the third cache line would have
the leakage bit-vector 0010. If these steps were executed sequentially, the leakage
bit-vectors 1000 and 0010 bit-wise disjoined would yield 1000 | 0010 = 1010.
An attacker that attacks (by using) the first and second cache line would have a
bit-vector 1100. If the leakage of the last high security step is 1010 and the attacker
has leakage bit-vector 1100, then the attacker would gain information about the first
cache line being used (since 1010 & 1100 = 1000), and the leakage would end up
in the state 1110 (since 1010 | 1100 = 1110) since the attacker must access these
cache lines to perform the attack.
The leakage value calculated from the cache attacks can also be more realistic.
In practice certain cache lines yield more information. So if the cache attack is being
modeled for an attack against the key of AES [16, 22], different lines can be given
different values, thus allowing precise computation of key leakage. Indeed, works such
as [11] could be used to determine the most appropriate leakage values to use.
Thus, the model presented in this paper already supports many interesting and real
scenarios by instantiating the leakage in an appropriate manner. This has been kept
simple earlier in the paper for illustration, but highly complex leakage models can easily
be accounted for in the manner demonstrated above.
7 Discussion
On the Division of Scheduling into Three Phases. The division into three phases is
to separate out distinct parts of an overall scheduling from tasks to a solution. This ap-
proach allows for separation conceptually of different phases, and also for composition
of simple algorithms in the pre- and postprocessing phases. For example, a postpro-
cessor could move steps in a solution around to maximize contiguousWs and then be
composed with the Add Flush postprocessor to improve the resulting leakage further.
This also allows different strategies to be employed in different phases, including strate-
gies with different goals. For example, processors for resulting leakage minimization
and energy consumption could be combined during pre- or postprocessing (or both).
Online Scheduling. This paper considers offline scheduling, i.e. when the tasks to be
scheduled are known beforehand. In most real cases the tasks appear at runtime, re-
quiring online heuristics to decide the scheduling. The division in steps and the leakage
model presented in this paper extend immediately to the online scenario. While the
preprocessors and postprocessors do not, they provide insight that can be used to build
online heuristics that reduce leakage. We consider this as future work.
Execution Time. This paper has considered the execution time to be essentially fixed
for each step. Although formally the execution time is worst case, the scheduling here
does not exploit when steps may terminate prior to their (worst case) execution time.
This could naturally be incorporated into online scheduling (above), but even in a purely
offline scheduling system this could be exploited. For example, consider the cache at-
tack scenario, where flushing not only effects the leakage, but by flushing the cache the
execution time will go up due to cache misses.
8 Conclusions and Future Work
In a system with shared resources, the security of confidential information is a ma-
jor concern. This paper allows reasoning about leakage of confidential information by
extending the workflow model to support fine-grained preemption and confidentiality.
This allows confidentiality to be addressed by quantifying the amount of information
leaked by the system, including different leakage models.
Scheduling in this new model is then considered using pre-and postprocessors.
These can be compositonally combined for scheduling that exploits different techniques
and approaches, including focusing on different aspects of the overall problem. Sev-
eral pre- and postprocessing heuristic algorithms are presented that can operate on the
model. These are focused upon improving resulting leakage, but the principles can be
adapted to other areas as well. Experimental results evaluate the algorithms presented
here, showing that the model and heuristics improve over the state of the art and show
that even simple heuristics can be effective. The case demonstrates the flexibility of the
model, and illustrates how to adapt to different kinds of leakage and scenarios.
Future work could generalise to multi-resource approaches, where scheduling con-
siders confidentiality, energy consumption, schedulability, etc. Another direction would
be to consider theoretical complexity, and optimal scheduling strategies.
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